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Reasoning about nondeterministic programs requires a specification of how their nondeterministic choices
are allowed to be resolved. When reasoning about safety properties, it is sound to overapproximate the
permitted behaviors. Once its safety is established, a program remains safe for every valid implementation
of its nondeterministic choices. Overapproximate specifications are less useful when establishing that a
nondeterministic program exhibits some desirable behavior, however, as resolving nondeterminism to specific
choices is not guaranteed to preserve the execution that resulted in the desirable final state. This paper
proposes a flexible way to underapproximate the behaviors of nondeterministic choices so that clients can
soundly reason about the existence of desirable behaviors, while at the same time permitting some freedom in
how those choices are implemented. We present a pair of program logics, called HLE and RHLE, that use these
specifications to reason about existential program behaviors in the single program and relational settings,
respectively. We have implemented a verifier based on these program logics that is capable of automatically
verifying a wide range of relational properties, including refinement and noninterference. We have evaluated
our approach by using this tool to verify a diverse set of programs and properties drawn from the literature.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: relational program logic, hyperproperties
1 INTRODUCTION
Reasoning about a program often requires abstracting over behaviors outside of the program’s direct
control. A program may relinquish control for reasons of design, for example by making calls to an
external API, or because nondeterminism is a critical part of its functionality, for example a game
or security application that must act according to the output of some random number generator.
A natural approach to reasoning in this environment is to adopt a nondeterministic language
semantics that admits any execution consistent with some specification of the nondeterministic
decisions that may occur. Intuitively, such a semantics provides an overapproximation of a program’s
actual executions, with some outside entity ultimately narrowing down the possible behaviors into
the executions actually exhibited by the program. (This could take the form of linking in a specific
API implementation or running a certain random number generation algorithm, for example.) The
question of how to usefully specify a program’s possible nondeterministic behaviors depends on
the kind of property being considered. When establishing safety properties, it is sound to rely on an
overapproximation of the possible implementations of a nondeterministic choice. Once established,
a safety property for the entire program is preserved for every valid implementation of this choice.
However, when showing that it is possible to reach some desired state, overapproximation is no
longer sound, as the subset of the non-deterministic choices ultimately exhibited by the program
may remove the desired execution path.
Recently, there has been interest in reasoning about underapproximations of program behaviors,
where the property of interest is that the program will necessarily exhibit some desirable behavior.
Existing work has focused on complete specifications of program behaviors, for example ensuring
that an implementation exhibits a complete range of desired behaviors [de Vries and Koutavas
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2011] or establishing the presence of bugs [OâĂŹHearn 2019]. The question of how to constrain
nondeterministic choices in this underapproximate setting is not so cut and dried, as we shall
see shortly. This paper proposes a flexible approach to underapproximating the behaviors of
nondeterministic choices, using a style which balances reasoning for “clients” of nondeterminism
against freedom for “implementors” of nondeterminism. The key idea is to specify these bounds
using relational specifications, so that we can choose from a set of overapproximate behaviors
to reason about a program’s nondeterministic choices, while still affording flexibility to how
those behaviors are resolved. This paper also presents a program logic which uses these looser
specifications in order to reason about underapproximate program behaviors, as well as a companion
program logic capable of reasoning about a class of relational properties which we call ∀∃-properties.
A wide range of relational properties can be expressed as ∀∃-properties, including refinement,
noninterference, and our relational function specifications. We have implemented an automatic
program verifier based on these program logics, called ORHLE, and used it to verify a diverse set of
programs and properties drawn from the literature.
1.1 A Motivating Example
x := TwoNums();
y := TwoNums()
(distinctXY)
To ground our discussion, consider the code snippet in
the figure to the right, which assigns the results of two
function calls to the variables x and y. In the absence of an
implementation of TwoNums, we need some specification
of its behavior in order to say anything interesting about
distinctXY. Let us assume that TwoNums has the following
axiomatic specification:
ax TwoNums(){⊤}{0 ≤ ρ < 5} (1)
Section 2 discusses the semantics of such specifications in more detail, but intuitively it states that
TwoNums must return some value (ρ) between 0 and 5. Semantically, TwoNums can be thought
of as a nondeterministic choice of an element of this set of values. Given this specification, the
possible executions of distinctXY can be represented as a tree as depicted in Figure 1, where the
root of the tree is the initial program state, the internal nodes represent a particular choice, and
the leaves are the final states of the tree. If we can prove that distinctXY is safe with respect to
some property, e.g. the sum of x and y in the final state is always between 0 and 10, it follows
every implementation of TwoNums that is faithful to its axiomatization will maintain the safety
of distinctXY. If we think of an implementation as resolving the nondeterminism embedded in
TwoNums, this is simply an example of how refinement preserves safety properties [Back 1981].
Of course, we might want distinctXY to exhibit other kinds of behaviors. Taking a cue from its
name, perhaps it should always be able to terminate in a final state where x and y have distinct
values. Clearly this is not always the case if we treat TwoNums as a choice of a value between 0
and 5, since we can always pick the same values for both function calls. Of course, we can exhibit
such a final state by, e.g. choosing 1 and 2 as the results for the first and second calls. We can think
of this as a sort of liveness property: for every initial state, there exists some desirable final state.
Such states are marked with ✓in Figure 1. Unfortunately, treating TwoNums as a nondeterministic
choice is more problematic, as there is no assurance that an implementation of TwoNumSpec will
preserve the path(s) that satisfy the liveness property. For example, a function that always returns
1 is a valid realization of the specification at (1), but such an implementation removes all of the
paths in Figure 1 that lead to desirable final states. In general, these sorts of liveness properties are
not necessarily preserved by refinement of nondeterministic choices [Jacob 1989].
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Fig. 1. The tree of possible executions of
distinctXY. Desirable final states (states
with distinct values for x and y) are
marked with ✓and undesirable final
states are marked with ✗.
Consider the restrictions that could be placed on an im-
plementation of TwoNums in order for distinctXY to en-
sure that this liveness property is preserved. Intuitively,
this amounts to identifying a lower bound on how the non-
deterministic choice can be resolved. In other words, we
require a minimum set of behaviors that all valid imple-
mentations of TwoNums must exhibit in order to maintain
the possibility of distinctXY ending in a state where x and
y have distinct values. A reasonable question is how to
specify these sorts of lower bounds. One approach is to
treat these as choices from a strict lower bound; a valid
implementation of this choice must be able to produce ev-
ery value in the set defining the bound. We could imagine
encoding such a bound in a similar manner to (1):
ax TwoNums(){⊤}{0 ≤ ρ < 3} (2)
This approach works, as we are assured that every ab-
stract choice in an execution path can also be produced
by a valid implementation. Requiring an implementation
of TwoNums to produce every value between 0 and 3 is
overkill, however, as an implementation of TwoNums re-
ally only needs to be able to return some pair of two distinct
values for distinctXY to exhibit the desired behavior. We
observe that this sort of “loose” lower bound can be ex-
pressed as the following relational specification:
ax∃ TwoNums(){⊤}{0 ≤ ρ1 < 2 ≤ ρ2 < 4} (3)
Section 3 provides the full semantics of this specification,
but at a high level a valid implementation of (3) must be
able to return a value that is less than 2 and another value
which is greater than or equal to 2. The variables ρ1 and ρ2
represent these two possible return values. The coloring
of the lines in Figure 1 indicates execution steps that are
consistent with one of these prescribed sets of results: red for ρ1, blue for ρ2, and black for the
rest. An implementation that flips a coin to choose between returning 1 and 3 is a perfectly fine
implementation of (3):
c := rand (); if c > 10 then x := 1 else x := 3 (TwoNumI)
An implementation that uses a random number generator to, e.g., return any value from 2 to 7 is
also fine. Prescribing required behaviors in the style (3) allows us to guarantee the liveness property
we are interested in while still leaving implementors some degree of freedom.
Unfortunately, as the implementation which flips a coin to choose between 1 and 3 demonstrates,
knowing that an implementation of TwoNums meets (3) does not guarantee that distinctXY will be
able to terminate in our aforementioned good state where 1 and 2. More generally, such loose lower
bounds do not ensure that the choices resulting in a “good” final state can be mimicked when the
nondeterminism is resolved. This complicates our ability to conclude that distinctXY exhibits good
behaviors whenever a valid implementation of (3) is provided. Intuitively, we need to show that there
exists a collection of executions of distinctXY which are allowed to fix one of the permitted relational
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∀ ∃ Precondition Postcondition
Refinement p1 p2 input1 = input2 return1 = return2
Noninterference p1 p2 Low1 = Low2 Low1 = Low2
Delimited Release p1 p2
Low1 = Low2 Low1 = Low2∧ DR1 = DR2
Parameter Usage — p,p′ parami , param
′
i ∧ return , return′∧
1≤j≤n, j,i
paramj = param
′
j
Fig. 2. Example encodings of various ∀∃ properties.
behaviors, e.g. ρ1, but which results in a good final state for every value consistent with that choice,
i.e. regardless of whether ρ1 = 0 or ρ1 = 1. Section 3 formalizes this principle precisely, yielding an
approach to reasoning that for ensures that resolving nondeterminism preserves the existence of
desirable executions, while still permitting flexible specifications on how that nondeterminism can
be resolved.
After formalizing these concepts in Section 3, the rest of the paper proceeds by presenting a
program logic in Section 4, called HLE, which is capable of using these specifications to prove
the existence of desirable program behaviors. In order to reason about implementations of these
relational specifications, Section 4 also develops a more general relational program logic, called
RHLE, capable of proving a range of interesting relational properties which include refinement
and non-interference. Section 5 then describes an algorithm based on RHLE for automatically
verifying these assertions. Figure 2 presents some examples of relational properties that can
be verified in RHLE. We have implemented a tool based on this algorithm, ORHLE. Section 6
presents an evaluation of ORHLE on a collection of representative examples. The anonymized
supplementary material includes the implementation of ORHLE, the complete set of benchmarks
presented Section 6, and a Coq formalization of the program logic and soundness proofs described
in Sections 2 and 4.
R
p
B P
We pause here to quickly relate the existential function
specifications from our motivating example to existing
work; a more detailed comparison is included in Section 7.
The red, blue, and purple regions in the diagram to the
right each represent a different kind of approximation of
nondeterministic behavior, while the black region labelled
p represents a valid implementation of each of those behav-
iors. R is an upper bound of p, in that it contains all of p’s
behaviors; standard Floyd-Hoare program logics [Hoare
1969] can be used to verify this kind of bound holds. In
these sorts of program logics we can prove that every final
state of the program x := 3 falls in the set of states satisfy-
ing x < 10, for example. In contrast, B represents a strong
lower bound on p, i.e., p exhibits every behavior prescribed by B. The more recently developed
Reverse Hoare and Incorrectness Logics [de Vries and Koutavas 2011; OâĂŹHearn 2019] can be
used to prove such lower bounds, e.g. that every state in the region x<4 is a possible final state of
the program x := rand() . The final region in the diagram, P, represents the sort of loose lower
bound on p that was described in our motivating example, i.e., p exhibits some of the behaviors
specified by P. HLE, the logic presented in Section 4, can be used to verify this sort of property,
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Fig. 3. Possible execution paths through a non-deterministic program from two different starting states.
Three hypothetical properties are depicted, with ✓representing an end state that satisfies the property and
✗ representing an end state that does not. In (1), every end state is desirable, which corresponds to both a
valid safety property and a valid liveness property. In (2), not all end states are desirable, but every starting
state can reach a desirable end state, corresponding to both the negation of a safety property and a valid
liveness property. In (3), one of the starting states cannot reach any desirable end state, and so corresponds
to the negation of a safety property but not to a valid liveness property.
proving the set of final states of TwoNumI from above and the region defined by (3) is non-empty,
for example.
We also pause to briefly emphasize some points about the problem. Since standard Hoare logic
is capable of verifying safety properties, it is tempting to try expressing the kinds of liveness
guarantees described above as negations of safety properties. For example, if we must guarantee
that it is always possible for distinctXY to terminate in a state with different x and y values, is it
enough to ensure the safety property {⊤} distinctXY {x = y} fails to hold? The problem with this
approach in general is that our definition of liveness requires a desired end state to be reachable
from every possible starting state, whereas the negation of the safety property holds given a desired
end state from at least one possible starting state. See Figure 3 for an illustration of this difference.
Note that without nondeterminism, however, our notions of safety and liveness do coincide, with
the caveat that our definition of liveness requires termination and would therefore require a total
program logic. Recall that handling nondeterminism in the program logic is desirable not only to
reason about programs with “random” behaviors, but also to reason about programs with unfixed
dependencies. Calling a function with an axiomatic specification but an unknown implementation
introduces nondeterministic execution paths when reasoning about overall program behavior, even
if the function will ultimately be linked to deterministic implementations.
2 PRELIMINARIES: THE FUNIMP LANGUAGE
We begin with the definition of FunIMP, a core imperative language which supports unbounded
nondeterminism [Dijkstra 1976] via function calls. The semantics of FunIMP uses axiomatic
specifications to evaluate calls to functions whose definitions are unavailable, permitting such calls
to nondeterministically evaluate to any value satisfying their specification. The syntax of FunIMP
is presented in Figure 4. The calculus is parameterized over disjoint sets of identifiers for variables,
V , and functions, N . Functions have a fixed arity and return a single value1. Concrete function
1ORHLE, the verification tool presented in Section 5, relaxes this latter restriction, allowing functions to return multiple
values
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n ∈N Constants
x ,y ∈V Variables
f ,д ∈N Function Names
P ,Q ∈A Assertions
c ::= skip | x := a | x := f (a)
Statements| c ; c | if b then c else c | while b do c end
a ::= n | x | a + a | a − a | a ∗ a Arithmetic Expressions
b ::= true | false | a = a | a < a | ¬b | b ∧ b Boolean Expressions
FS ::= ax f (x) {P}{Q} Function Axiomatization
FD ::= def f (x) {c; return a} Function Definitions
Fig. 4. Syntax of FunIMP.
Bounded Random Number Generation ax RandB(x ) { ⊤ } { ρ < x }
Modulo ax mod(x , y) { x ≤ y } { ∃k .k ∗ x + ρ = y }
Minimum ax min(x , y, z) { ⊤ } { ρ ≤ x ∧ ρ ≤ y ∧ ρ ≤ z∧
(ρ = x ∨ ρ = y ∨ ρ = z) }
Binary Nondeterministic Choice (a1 ⊔ a2) ax choose(x , y) { ⊤ } { ρ = x ∨ ρ = y }
Fig. 5. Example Axiomatic Function Specifications.
definitions consist of a sequence of statements followed by an expression that computes the result
of the function. For clarity, we denote the sequence of arguments x1, . . . ,xn as x .
The calculus is also parameterized over an assertion language, A which is used to axiomatically
specify the behavior of functions. The variables used in these assertions are drawn from V ,
augmented with a distinguished variable, which we denote as ρ. Axiomatic function specifications
consist of a pair of assertions corresponding to pre- and postconditions, where both conditions
can refer to function parameters. In addition, postconditions can use the variable ρ to refer to the
result of the function. Figure 5 gives example axiomatic specifications of random number, modulo,
minmum, and binary choice (⊔) functions. This last function illustrates how function function calls
in FunIMP can be also be thought of as a nondeterministic choice.
The semantics of FunIMP is given as a big-step reduction relation from initial to final states.
This relation is parameterized over two contexts used to evaluate function calls. The first axiomatic
context, S ∈ N → FS, is a total mapping from function identifiers to their axiomatic specifications,
while the second implementation context, I ∈ N ⇀ FD, is a partial mapping from function names
to definitions. Thus, while every function has a specification in S , it does not necessarily have a
corresponding definition in I . FunIMP program states, σ ∈ V → N, are mappings from variables
to their current value. The reduction relation is also parameterized over an interpretation used to
determine the validity of assertions; we write σ |= P to denote that the assertion P holds in state σ .
We condense sequences of repeated expressions in similar way to function arguments, writing the
sequence S, I ⊢ σ ,a1 ⇓ v1 · · · S, I ⊢ σ ,an ⇓ vn as S, I ⊢ σ ,a ⇓ v and [x1 7→ v1, . . . ,xn 7→ vn] as
[x 7→ v], for example.
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S, I ⊢ σ , skip ⇓ σ ESkip
σ , a ⇓ v
S, I ⊢ σ , x := a ⇓ [x 7→ v]σ EAssgn
S, I ⊢ σ , c1 ⇓ σ ′ S, I ⊢ σ ′, c1 ⇓ σ ′′
S, I ⊢ σ , c1; c2 ⇓ σ ′′
ESeq
σ , b ⇓ true S, I ⊢ σ , c1 ⇓ σ ′
S, I ⊢ σ , if b then c1 else c2 ⇓ σ ′
ECondT
σ , b ⇓ ⊥ S, I ⊢ σ , c2 ⇓ σ ′
S, I ⊢ σ , if b then c1 else c2 ⇓ σ ′
ECondF
σ , b ⇓ true S, I ⊢ σ , c ⇓ σ ′
S, I ⊢ σ ′, while b do c end ⇓ σ ′′
S, I ⊢ σ , while b do c end ⇓ σ ′′ EWhileT
σ , b ⇓ ⊥
S, I ⊢ σ , while b do c end ⇓ σ EWhileF
I (f ) = def f (x ) {s ; return e } S, I ⊢ σ , a ⇓ v S, I ⊢ [x 7→ v], s ⇓ σ ′ S, I ⊢ σ ′, e ⇓ r
S, I ⊢ σ , y := f (a) ⇓ [y 7→ r ]σ ECallImpl
f < I S (f ) = ax f (x ) {P } {Q }
S, I ⊢ σ , a ⇓ v S, I ⊢ σ ′, e ⇓ r [x 7→ v] |= P [ρ 7→ r, x 7→ v] |= Q
S, I ⊢ σ , y := f (a) ⇓ [y 7→ r ]σ ECallAx
Fig. 6. Big-step semantics of FunIMP.
The evaluation rules of FunIMP are presented in Figure 6. Several of the rules rely on an evaluation
relation for boolean and arithmetic expressions, σ , e ⇓ v , whose straightforward definition we elide
here. Functions in FunIMP are call by value; their semantics is given by the rules ECallAx and
ECallImpl. If an implementation of f is available in I when evaluating x := f (a), ECallImpl uses a
state built from the arguments a to evaluate the body of the definition, and the result of the function
is assigned to x . Alternatively, if an implementation of f is not available in I , ECallAx allows
x to be assigned any value consistent with its postcondition in S , assuming that its arguments a
satisfy the corresponding precondition. If function calls are interpreted as the nondeterministic
choice of a value satisfying its axiomatic specification, including a corresponding definition in the
implementation context explains how that choice is to be resolved.
S0, I0 ⊢ ·,y := RandB(20) ⇓ [y 7→ 5] (4)
S0, I0 ⊢ ·,y := RandB(20) ⇓ [y 7→ 18] (5)
S0, I0 ⊢ ·,y := RandB(0) ̸⇓ (6)
S1, · ⊢ ·,y := RandB(0) ̸⇓ (7)
S1, I1 ⊢ ·,y := RandB(10) ⇓ [y 7→ 5] (8)
S1, I1 ⊢ ·,y := RandB(6) ⇓ [y 7→ 5] (9)
Fig. 7. Differing executions of function calls un-
der the following contexts:
S0(RandB) = ax RandB(x){⊤}{ρ < x}
I0(RandB) = ⊥
S1(RandB) = ax RandB(x){0 < x}{ρ < x}
I1(RandB) = def RandB(x){return 5}
Example Function Call Evaluations. The figure to
the right presents several examples of the semantics
of function calls. When run in a specification context
that includes the definition of RandB from Figure 5
and an implementation context where RandB is un-
defined, the programy := RandB(20) can evaluate to
any final state where the value of y is non-negative
and less than 20 (4 + 5). In contrast, the evaluation
ofy := RandB(0) in the same contexts will get stuck,
as there is no ρ such that 0 ≤ ρ < 0 (6). If we up-
date the axiomatization of RandB to include the pre-
condition that x be greater than zero, ax RandB(x)
{(0 < x } {(ρ < x }, also results in a stuck evaluation
of y := RandB(0), but this time because the precon-
dition is not met (7). We say that an initial state is
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OK (denoted S ⊢ σ , p is OK) for a program p and
axiomatic context S if p will never get stuck when run in that state. Finally, if the implemen-
tation context is updated to include an implementation of RandB that always returns 5, then
y := RandB(k) will always evaluate to the final state [y 7→ 5] regardless of the value of k (8 + 9).
These last two examples demonstrates how the semantics of FunIMP does not force any sort
of a relationship between function specifications and their implementations. y := RandB(k) will
always evaluate to a final state where y 7→ 5 if this function definition is available, even though
this only makes sense when k is at least 6. Intuitively, a pair of contexts is only compatible when
the available function definitions align with their axiomatic specifications. More precisely, we say
that a function definition is a valid implementation of a specification if, whenever its body is run in
an initial state satisfying the precondition, every final state it produces satisfies the postcondition:
S, I , def f (x){s; return e} |= ax f (x){P}{Q} ≡
∀v . [x 7→ v] |= P ∧ S, I ⊢ [x 7→ v], s ⇓ σ ′ ∧ σ ′, e ⇓ v ′ =⇒ [ρ 7→ v ′,x 7→ v] |= Q
We can straightforwardly lift this property to define when an implementation context is compatible
with an axiomatic context:
I |= S ≡ ∀f ∈ I .S, I , I (f ) |= S(f )
Intuitively, the set of (not stuck) final states of a program under any compatible context is a subset
of those it can produce when evaluated using just the axiomatic context. We call the latter set the
axiomatic executions of a program. This intuition leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1. When run under a compatible context I with an OK initial state σ , a program p will
either diverge or evaluate to a state σ ′ which is also produced by one of its axiomatic executions.
I |= S ∧ S ⊢ σ , p is OK ∧ S, I ⊢ σ ,p ⇓ σ ′ =⇒ S, · ⊢ σ ,p ⇓ σ ′
Proof. In Appendix B. □
In other words, the axiomatic executions of a client program yield an overapproximation of its
behaviors when run with a compatible set of function definitions. A direct corollary of this theorem
is that compatible contexts preserve every safety property which holds on a program’s axiomatic
executions.
Corollary 2.2. If some property Q holds for all the final states of the axiomatic executions of a
program p resulting from some OK initial state σ , Q will also hold for every final state σ ′ produced
under a compatible context.
(∀σ ′′.S, · ⊢ σ ,p ⇓ σ ′′ =⇒ σ ′′ |= Q) ∧ I |= S ∧ S ⊢ σ , p is OK ∧ S, I ⊢ σ ,p ⇓ σ ′ =⇒ σ ′ |= Q
This corollary admits the standard modular reasoning principle, where if a client of some API
has been shown to be safe using an axiomatization of its interface, we can conclude that linking
the client with verified implementations of those interfaces will continue to be safe. Alternatively,
the axiomatization of functions that cannot be verified (e.g. they represent an abstraction of the
outside world or we do not have access to their implementations) can simply be admitted as part of
the trusted code base of the program.
3 EXISTENTIAL REASONING
The axiomatic specifications presented in the previous section are well-suited for proving that
resolving the nondeterminism in a FunIMP program will never result in new, bad behaviors. We
now consider a related question: how do we show that resolving nondeterminism in a program will
not eliminate existing, desirable behaviors? Our ultimate goal is the development of an analogue to
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Theorem 2.2 that ensures the continued existence of good behaviors given appropriate implemen-
tations of axiomatic function calls. This theorem underpins the program logic for reasoning about
the existence of desirable behaviors presented in the next section.
3.1 Underapproximate Function Specifications
We begin by formalizing the syntax and semantics of our specifications for lower bounds on
nondeterministic choices (i.e., function calls.) Our goal is to give flexibility in how these choices
can be resolved while ensuring that the desirable behaviors of the larger program containing them
are maintained. The syntax for existential function specifications is similar to our axiomatic function
specifications with the key difference that their postconditions are now relational assertions, as
mentioned in Section 1.1.
Φ,Ψ ∈ A Relational Assertions
FE ::= ax∃ f (x) n {P} {Ψ} Existential Function Specifications
As normal assertions are predicates on a single state, a relational assertion is a predicate on k states.
Following existing convention [Sousa and Dillig 2016], every variable in a relational assertion is
indexed by natural number identifying which state it belongs to. As an example, the relational
assertion x1 ≤ x2 is a predicate over two states, and it is satisfied when the value of x in the
first state is less than the value of x in the second. Here are some additional statements involving
relational assertions:
[x 7→ 0], [x 7→ 0] |= x1 ≤ x2
[x 7→ 2,y 7→ 3], [x 7→ 10,y 7→ 1] |= y2 < x1
[x 7→ 1,y 7→ 24, z 7→ 13], [x 7→ 2,y 7→ 1, z 7→ 4] |= x1 = 1 ∨ (x1 > y1 ∧ x2 > z2)
[x 7→ 10,y 7→ 2, z 7→ 3], [x 7→ 12,y 7→ 1, z 7→ 4] |= x1 = 1 ∨ (x1 > y1 ∧ x2 > z2)
For clarity, existential function specifications include a number n indicating how many states the
postcondition ranges over. Our existential function specifications are an example of a hyperprop-
erty [Clarkson and Schneider 2010], a property that depends on a multiple executions of the same
program (in this case, the body of the function.)
Deferring for now the definition of when a function correctly implements such specifications, we
first need to identify a property which is sufficient to ensure the existence of a final program state in
which some desired property holds and is strong enough to be preserved by correct implementations
of existential specifications. One immediate candidate is simply the existence of a trace consistent
with some context of existential specifications E ⊆ N → FE, perhaps using an alternative semantics
for FunIMP which uses such a context to evaluate axiomatic function calls:
f < I E(f ) = ax∃ f (x) n{P} {Ψ} E, I ⊢ σ ,a ⇓ v
E, I ⊢ σ ′, e ⇓ ri [x 7→ v] |= P [ρ 7→ r1,x 7→ v], . . . [ρ 7→ rn ,x 7→ v] |= Ψ
E, I ⊢ σ ,y := f (a) ⇓∃ [y 7→ ri ]σ
ECallAx∃
While the existence of such a trace is certainly sufficient, it is not strong enough for our purposes:
the existence of any single particular trace is not necessarily preserved when a function definition
is provided. Under this semantics, distinctXY, the program from our motivating example can
certainly evaluate to the state [x 7→ 1;y 7→ 7] when run in a existential context containing (3), for
example, but the same state does not necessarily a result for every implementation of TwoNums
that produces two distinct values.
Instead we need distinctXY to satisfy a stronger property, namely that there exists a set of
existential executions which all terminate in a final state where x and y have distinct values and
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E, I ⊢ σ , skip ' {σ ′ | σ ′ = σ } PSkip σ , a ⇓ vE, I ⊢ σ , x := a ' {σ ′ | σ ′ = [x 7→ v]σ } PAssn
E, I ⊢ σ , c1 ' Q (∀σ ′ ∈ Q . E, I ⊢ σ ′, c1 ' Q ′)
E, I ⊢ σ , c1; c2 ' Q ′ PSeq Q ⊆ Q
′ E, I ⊢ σ , c ' Q
E, I ⊢ σ , c ' Q ′ PWeaken
σ , b ⇓ true E, I ⊢ σ , c1 ' Q
E, I ⊢ σ , if b then c1 else c2 ' Q PCondT σ , b ⇓ ⊥ E, I ⊢ σ , c2 ' QE, I ⊢ σ , if b then c1 else c2 ' Q PCondF
σ , b ⇓ true E, I ⊢ σ , c ' Q
∀σ ′ ∈ Q .E, I ⊢ σ ′, while b do c end ' Q ′
E, I ⊢ σ , while b do c end ' Q ′ PWhileT σ , b ⇓ ⊥E, I ⊢ σ , while b do c end ' {σ ′ | σ ′ = σ } PWhileF
I (f ) = def f (x ) {s ; return e } E, I ⊢ σ , a ⇓ v E, I ⊢ [x 7→ v], s ' Q
E, I ⊢ σ , y := f (a) ' {σ ′ | ∃v . σ ′ = [y 7→ v]σ ∧ ∃σ ′′ ∈ Q . σ ′′, e ⇓ v } PCallImpl
f < I E(f ) = ax∃ f (x )n {P } {Ψ}
E, I ⊢ σ , a ⇓ v [x 7→ v] |= P [ρ1 7→ r1, x 7→ v], . . . , [ρn 7→ rnx 7→ v] |= Ψ
E, I ⊢ σ , y := f (a) ' {σ ′ | ∃v . σ ′ = [y 7→ vi ]σ ∧ [ρ1 7→ v1, x 7→ v], . . . , [ρn 7→ vnx 7→ v] |= Ψ} PCallAx
Fig. 8. The productivity relation.
which includes a trace covering every return value produced by a particular choice of relational
behaviors. Concretely, such a set exists for distinctXY. If x is assigned any result less than ⌈k/2⌉
according to the first behavior of (3), it is always possible to complete the trace by picking a
distinct final value for y from the second behavior when evaluating the next call. In the graphical
representation of distinctXY presented in Figure 1, for example, this means each of the red branches
out of the root has at least one leaf node where x , y.
We formalize this stronger property via the inductively defined productivity relation whose rules
are given in Figure 8. The judgements of this relation are denoted as E I ⊢ σ ,p ' Q which reads
as: under existential context E and implementation context I , from initial state σ the program
p can always produce a final state satisfying some assertion Q . Most of the rules in Figure 8
adapt the existing FunIMP evaluation rules to account for the fact that commands produce sets of
states from an initial state. The productivity rule for sequences, PSeq, for example, simply ensures
that c2 can terminate in appropriate states for every state in the set produced by c1. The rule for
(existential) axiomatic function calls, PCallAx, is the most interesting; it essentially chooses one
of the n existential behaviors permitted by the specification and produces a set containing every
value satisfying that behavior. Figure 9 gives examples of two productivity facts about distinctXY
corresponding to the two possible existential behaviors permitted by the specification in (3).
In order for productivity to be sufficient for our purposes, every choice permitted by the existential
context used for productivity must also be permitted by the axiomatic context for evaluation. That
is, every pair of initial and final states satisfying an existential specification in E must also satisfy
the corresponding specification in S :
∀f .S(f ) = ax f (x) {P} {Q} ∧ E(f ) = ax∃ f (x) n{P ′} {Ψ} =⇒
(∀σ . σ |= P ′ =⇒ σ |= P) ∧ ∀σ .σ |= Ψ =⇒ (∀i .σi |= Q)
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E0(TwoNums) = ax∃ TwoNums(){⊤}{0 ≤ ρ1 < 2 ≤ ρ2 < 4}
.
.
.
E0, · ⊢ ·, x := TwoNums() ' {σ | ∃v1 v2 .σ = [x 7→ v1] ∧[ρ1 7→ v1], [ρ2 7→ v2] |= 0 ≤ ρ1 < 2 ≤ ρ2 < 4
} PCallAx
E0, · ⊢ ·, x := TwoNums() ' {σ |∃v1 .σ = [x 7→ v1] ∧ 0 ≤ v1 < 2} PWeaken
E0(TwoNums) = ax∃ TwoNums(){⊤}{0 ≤ ρ1 < 2 ≤ ρ2 < 4}
.
.
.
E0, · ⊢ ·, x := TwoNums() ' {σ | ∃v1 v2 .σ = [x 7→ v2] ∧[ρ1 7→ v1], [ρ2 7→ v2] |= 0 ≤ ρ1 < 2 ≤ ρ2 < 4
} PCallAx
E0, · ⊢ ·, x := TwoNums() ' {σ |∃v2 .σ = [x 7→ v2] ∧ 2 ≤ v2 < 4} PWeaken
Fig. 9. Two productivity facts about x := TwoNums().
E, I ⊢ σ , skip ⋏ {σ ′ | σ ′ = σ }
RPDone
Ψ ⊆ Ψ′ E, I ⊢ σ , c ⋏ Ψ
E, I ⊢ σ , c ⋏ Ψ′ RPWeaken
E, I ⊢ σ , c ; skip ⋏ Ψ
E, I ⊢ σ , c ⋏ Ψ RPSkipIntro
E, I ⊢ σi , ci ' Q ∀σ ′i ∈ Q .E, I ⊢ σ1; . . . ;σ ′i ; . . . ;σn , c1 ⊛ . . . ⊛ c ′i ⊛ . . . ⊛ cn ⋏ Ψ
E, I ⊢ σ , c1 ⊛ . . . ⊛ ci ; c ′i ⊛ . . . ⊛ cn ⋏ Ψ
RPStep
Fig. 10. The relational productivity relation.
A pair of existential and axiomatic contexts, E and S , which satisfy this property are said to be
coherent, which we denote as S ⊇ E. Importantly, this relation is sufficient enough to guarantee the
existence of an appropriate final state: given coherent existential and axiomatic contexts E and S , if
a program p produces a set of states Q with implementation context I and initial state σ , p can also
terminate in some state satisfying Q when executed from σ in I .
In order to show that productivity also is also strong enough for existential reasoning, we must
formalize what it means for a function definition to meet an existential specification. Intuitively,
a function definition correctly implements an existential function specification if it can always
produce a set of final states satisfying the relational postcondition from an initial state satisfying
the precondition. Figure 10 presents a relational version of the productivity relation that encodes
this intuition. The judgements of this relation are denoted E, I ⊢ σ ,p ⋏ Ψ, and express that when
executed in initial states σ , the programs p can always produce a set of final states satisfying the
relational assertion Ψ. To avoid clashing with FunIMP’s sequence operator, the rules use ⊛ to
separate programs. Given this relation, our desired definition follows immediately:
E, I , def f (x){s; return e} |=∃ ax∃ f (x) n {P}{Ψ} ≡
∀v . [x 7→ v] |= P =⇒ E, I ⊢ [x 7→ v], s ⋏ Ψ[e/ρ]
We lift this property to define compatibility between implementation and existential contexts:
I |=∃ E ≡ ∀f ∈ I .E, I , I (f ) |=∃ E(f )
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Productivity is strong enough to be preserved by combatible implementation contexts, yielding the
following reasoning principle:
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that existential and axiomatic contexts E and S are coherent, and furthermore
that the function context I is compatible with E. If a program p that is productive from initial state σ
with respective to set Q , then it must be the case that from σ p is able to terminate in some final state
σ ′ satisfying Q :
E, · ⊢ σ ,p ' Q ∧ I |=∃ E ∧ S ⊇ I =⇒ ∃σ ′.S, I ⊢ σ ,p ⇓ σ ′ ∧ σ ′ |= Q
Proof. In Appendix B. □
4 EXISTENTIAL PROGRAM LOGICS
We now present HLE, a program logic for deducing that a program is productive. The assertions of
HLE are the following variant of standard Hoare triples:
E |= [P] p [Q]∃ ≡ ∀σ . σ |= P =⇒ E, · ⊢ σ ,p ' Q
This triple states that program p will produce set Q under existential context E from every initial
state satisfying P . By Theorem B.2, it follows that p can terminate in a state satisfying Q in every
compatible implementation context. To emphasize that these triples make claims about a program’s
termination behavior, the pre- and postconditions of these triples are demarcated using the square
bracket notation of total program logics, i.e., writing [P] instead of {P}.
|= P =⇒ P ′ |= Q ′ =⇒ Q E ⊢ [P ′] c [Q ′]∃
E ⊢ [P] c [Q]∃
∃Conseq
E ⊢ [P] skip [P]∃
∃Skip
E ⊢ [P[a/x]] x := a [P]∃
∃Assgn E ⊢ [P] c1
[
P ′
]
∃ E ⊢
[
P ′
]
c2 [Q]∃
E ⊢ [P] c1; c2 [Q]∃
∃Seq
E ⊢ [P ∧ b] c1 [Q]∃ E ⊢ [P ∧ ¬b] c2 [Q]∃
E ⊢ [P] if b then c1 else c2 [Q]∃
∃Cond
R is well-founded E ⊢ [P ∧ b ∧ M a] c [P ∧ ∃a′.M a′ ∧ a′ R a]∃
E ⊢ [P ∧ ∃a.M a] while b do c end [P ∧ ¬b]∃
∃While
E(f ) = ax∃ f (x) n {P} {Q ′}
E ⊢

[x 7→ a] |= P
∧ ∃v .[ρ1 7→ v1,x 7→ a], . . . , [ρn 7→ vn ,x 7→ a], |= Q ′
∧
∨
0<k≤n
∀v .[ρ1 7→ v1,x 7→ a], . . . , [ρn 7→ vn ,x 7→ a] |= Q ′ =⇒ Q[vk/y]

y := f (a) [Q]∃
∃Spec
Fig. 11. HLE proof rules.
Figure 11 presents the proof rules of HLE. These rules are largely standard, outside of the rules for
loops and function calls. The former rule, ∃While, needs to guarantee at least one terminating path
through a loop exists. To do so, ∃While identifies a variant a drawn from some set A, a measure
relationM ⊆ State ×A, and a well-founded relation R ⊆ A ×A which are used to augment the pre-
and postconditions of the loop body in order to ensure at least one execution of the loop body makes
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E(choose) = ax∃ choose(x, y) 2 {⊤} {ρ1 = x ∧ ρ2 = y }
E ⊢

⊤
∧ ∃v1v2 . v1 = k + 1 ∧ v2 = 0
∧ ∀v1v2 . v1 = k + 1 ∧ v2 = 0
=⇒ 4 − v1 < a

k := k + 1 ⊔ 0 [4 − k < a]∃
∃SpecK
E ⊢ [⊤ ∧ k < 4 ∧ a = 4 − k ] k := k + 1 ⊔ 0 [⊤ ∧ ∃a′.a′ = 4 − k ∧ a′ < a]∃ ∃Conseq
E ⊢ [⊤ ∧ ∃a .a = 4 − k ] while k < 4 do k := k + 1 ⊔ 0 end [⊤ ∧ 3 < k ]∃
∃While
E ⊢ [k = 0] while k < 4 do k := k + 1 ⊔ 0 end [⊤]∃
∃Conseq
Fig. 12. Example HLE derivation.
progress to a final state. In practice, our verifier based on HLE uses natural numbers for A, equality
forM , and the standard less than relation for R, but ∃While uses this general formulation to account
for the fact that axiomatic function calls represent unbounded nondeterministic choices [Dijkstra
1982]. The ∃Spec rule adapts the standard assignment rule to reflect that the result of a function
call is being assigned. The first of the three conjuncts in its precondition ensures that the statement
is executing in a state satisfying the function’s precondition, preventing the stuck execution from
example (7) in Figure 7. The next conjunct ensures that the function is realizable when the function
is executed by requiring the function’s postcondition to be inhabited, preventing the stuck execution
from example (6) in Figure 7. The final conjunct shows how ∃Spec integrates a hyperproperty on n
function executions to verify a property of a single execution of the client of that function. The
large disjunction in this conjunct establishes that a desired postcondition Q will hold for every
possible result of at least one of the function’s n existential behaviors. The following admissible
∃SpecK rule embodies this intuition by fixing which of the n relational behaviors is used in the
proof when the rule is applied:
E(f ) = ax∃ f (x) n {P} {Q ′}
E ⊢

[x 7→ a] |= P
∧ ∃v .[ρ1 7→ v1,x 7→ a], . . . , [ρn 7→ vn ,x 7→ a], |= Q ′
∧ ∀v .[ρ1 7→ v1,x 7→ a], . . . , [ρn 7→ vn ,x 7→ a] |= Q ′ =⇒ Q[vk/y]
 y := f (a) [Q]∃
∃SpecK
Figure 12 presents an example HLE derivation. Note that the program in this derivation can loop
forever by choosing to add 0 to k at every iteration of the loop body. Nevertheless, by using
M a σ ≡ a = 4 − k and R a a′ ≡ a′ < a, we can prove a terminating path through the program
exists.
4.1 RHLE: A Relational Program Logic for ∀∃-Properties
In order to complete our verification story, we also need a technique for proving that a function
implementation satisfies its existential specification. Before presenting our program logic, we note
our existential function specifications are a kind of k-liveness hyperproperties, in the sense that they
proscribe the existence of some “good” behavior that depends on k executions. In contrast, k-safety
hyperproperties specify the absence of some “bad” behaviors which depends on k executions. In
general, any hyperproperty is a combination of a safety and liveness hyperproperty. Exploiting
this observation, we present a program logic, called RHLE, for verifying combinations of safety
and liveness relational properties. In particular, the assertions of RHLE range over a set of k + j
programs, and are of the form for all the final states of the first k programs, there exists some
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corresponding collection of final states of the final j programs that satisfy some relational property.
We call these sorts of relational properties ∀∃ properties. ∀∃ properties can be used to express
hyperproperties like the productivity of function implementations, as well as semantic forms of
program refinement and parameter usage and several forms of noninterference for nondeterministic
programs, as Section 6 will describe in more detail.
More formally, the assertions of RHLE are the following relational Hoare triples:
S,E |= ⟨Φ⟩ p∀ ∼∃ p∃ ⟨Ψ⟩ ≡
∀σ∀ σ∃. σ∀,σ∃ |= Φ ∧ ∀σ ′∀. S ⊢ σ∀,p∀ ⇓ σ ′∀ =⇒ E, · ⊢ σ∃,p∃ ⋏ {σ ′∃ | σ ′∀,σ ′∃ |= Ψ}
These assertions use ∼∃ to separate the programs whose final states are universally quantified on
the left from those whose final states are existentially quantified on the right. Just as we did in the
rules for ⋏, we use ⊛ to demarcate between programs on each side of ∼∃ . Note that we can encode
k-liveness hyperproperties like E, I ⊢ FD |=∃ FE as one of these triples with a single skip statement
to the left of ∼∃ and k copies of a program to its right (which we denote as ⊛k [·]):
E, ·, def f (x){s; return e} |=∃ ax∃ f (x) n {P}{Ψ} ≡ S,E |=
〈 ∧
1<i≤n
P[xi/x]
〉
skip ∼∃ ⊛n[s] ⟨Ψ[e/ρ]⟩
We can similarly encode k-safety hyperproperties such as injectivity of a function f by placing k
copies on the universal side of ∼∃ and skip on the existential side.
S,E |= ⟨x1 , x2⟩ ⊛2 [y := f (x)] ∼∃ skip ⟨y1 , y2⟩
S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ⟩ skip ∼∃ skip ⟨Φ⟩
Finish
S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ⟩ c∀; skip ∼∃ c∃; skip ⟨Ψ⟩
S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ⟩ c∀ ∼∃ c∃ ⟨Ψ⟩
SkipIntro
(∀σ σ∃. S ⊢ {Φ |i σ , σ∃} ci {Φ′ |i σ , σ∃}) S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ′⟩ c1 ⊛ . . . ⊛ c ′i ⊛ . . . ⊛ cn ∼∃ c∃ ⟨Ψ⟩
S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ⟩ c1 ⊛ . . . ⊛ ci ; c ′i ⊛ . . . ⊛ cn ∼∃ c∃ ⟨Ψ⟩
Step∀
(∀σ∀ σ . E ⊢ [Φ |i σ∀, σ ] ci
[
Φ′ |i σ∀, σ
]
∃) S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ′⟩ c∀ ∼∃ c1 ⊛ . . . ⊛ c ′i ⊛ . . . ⊛ cn ⟨Ψ⟩
S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ⟩ c∀ ∼∃ c1 ⊛ . . . ⊛ ci ; c ′i ⊛ . . . ⊛ cn ⟨Ψ⟩
Step∃
Fig. 13. RHLE proof rules.
RHLE is a relational program logic for reasoning about the sorts of relational properties encoded
by these semantic relational Hoare triples. Figure 13 gives a complete listing of the proof rules of
the logic. The first two rules are used to end derivations: the SkipIntro rule appends a final skip
statement to the end of universal and existential programs; these final skips act as flags that allow
the Finish axiom to be applied to end a derivation after the proof has fully considered the behavior
of each program. The Step∃ and Step∀ rules both work by using a logic for single programs to
prove that the topmost command of one of their respective programs meets some postcondition
Φ′; this postcondition is then used as the precondition for further relational reasoning. Both rules
make use of a projection operation, σ |iΨ, which maps a relational assertion to a regular one. Given
a collection of n states, Ψ |i σ is satisfied by any state σ ′ which satisfies Ψ when inserted at the ith
position:
σ ′ |= Ψ |i σ ≡ σ1, . . . ,σi−1,σ ′,σi+1, . . . ,σn |= Ψ
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In effect, the projection operation is used to ensure the states of the other programs remain
unchanged during the first of these steps.
The appendix includes the full set of inference rules for the universal program logic used in the
Step∀ rule. The only notable rule is ∀Spec, which reasons about function calls using only their
specifications in S :
S(f ) = ax f (x){P}{Q}
S ⊢
{
[x 7→ a] |= P ∧ ∀v .[ρ 7→ v ;x 7→ a] |= Q =⇒ R[v/y]
}
y := f (a) {R}
∀Spec
Equipped with these two single program logics and our relational program logic, we can now
state and prove the full modular reasoning principle that RHLE enables:
Theorem 4.1 (RHLE is Sound). Suppose we are given a pair of coherent existential and axiomatic
contexts E and S , and that furthermore we can deduce the RHLE triple S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ⟩ p∀ ∼∃ p∃ ⟨Ψ⟩. Then,
for any function context I compatible with both S and E, any set of initial states σ∀ and σ∃ satisfying
Φ, and for every set of final states σ ′∀ produced by p∀, there exists a corresponding set of final states
produced by p∃ such that σ ′∀ and σ
′
∃ satisfy Ψ:
S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ⟩ p∀ ∼∃ p∃ ⟨Ψ⟩ ∧ S ⊇ E ∧ (∀σ .σ |= Φ =⇒ S ⊢ σ , p∀ is OK) =⇒
∀I . I |= S ∧ I |=∃ E =⇒
∀σ∀ σ∃. σ∀ σ∃ |= Φ =⇒
∀σ ′∀. S, I ⊢ σ∀,p∀ ⇓ σ ′∀ =⇒ ∃σ ′∃. S, I ⊢ σ∃,p∃ ⇓ σ ′∃ ∧ σ ′∀, σ ′∃ |= Ψ
Proof. In Appendix B. □
5 VERIFICATION
Algorithm 2: RhleVC
Inputs :Φ, a relational precondition
p∀, universal programs
p∃, existential programs
Ψ, a relational postcondition,
S , an axiomatic context
E, an existential context
Output :verifiability of ⟨Φ⟩ p∀ ∼∃ p∃ ⟨Ψ⟩
begin
if empty(p∀) ∧ empty(p∃) then
return Verify(Φ =⇒ Ψ)
else
(c,K ,p′∀,p′∃) ←
ChooseStep(p∀,p∃,Φ,Ψ)
Ψ′ ← StatementVC (c,K ,Ψ, S,E)
return RhleVC(Φ,p′∀,p′∃,Ψ
′, S,E)
This section presents a procedure based on RHLE
for automatically verifying ∀∃ properties. The high-
level approach is to generate verification conditions
by reasoning backward from the relational post-
condition by applying Step∀ and Step∃ until all
program statements have been considered.
The verification procedure is parameterized over
the following procedures:
Verify: a decision procedure for the underlying
assertion logic.
Variant: an oracle that provides loop variants.
Invariant: an oracle that provides loop invari-
ants.
Simplify: a procedure that optionally simplifies
a (potentially large) existential postcondition to
more manageable equisatisfiable formula. The
returned formula may include a set of fresh exis-
tentially quantified variables t that can be instan-
tiated if and only if the original postcondition is
satisfiable. Section 6 has a discussion on how this works in practice.
We also assume a procedure calledChooseStep(p∀,p∃) that accepts a list of universally quantified
programs p∀ and a list of existentially quantified programs p∃. ChooseStep is responsible for
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Algorithm 1: StatementVC
Inputs :c , a FunIMP program statement
K , a tag identifying whether c is on the universal or existential side of ∼∃
Ψ, a relational postcondition
S , an axiomatic context
E, an existential context
Output :verification conditions for c to meet Ψ in the given quantification context
begin
match c:
case skip do
return Ψ
case y := a do
return Ψ[a/y]
case y := f (a) do
if K = ∀ then
(P ,Q) ← S(f )
return P[a/x] ∧ ∀v .(Q[v/ρ,a/x] =⇒ Ψ[v/y])
else if K = ∃ then
(P ,Q) ← E(f )
inhabited← ∃t ,v . Simplify(Q[v/ρ,a/x])
valid← ∃t . ∀v . Simplify(∨0<k≤n Q[v/ρ,a/x] =⇒ Ψ[vk/y])
return P[a/x] ∧ inhabited ∧ valid
case c1; c2 do
Ψ′ ← StatementVC(c2,K ,Ψ, S,E)
return StatementVC(c1,K ,Ψ′, S,E)
case if b then ct else cf do
Ψt ← StatementVC(ct ,K ,Ψ, S,E)
Ψf ← StatementVC(cf ,K ,Ψ, S,E)
return (b =⇒ Ψt ) ∧ (¬b =⇒ Ψf )
case while b do cb end do
v ← Vars(cb)
v ′ ← Fresh(v)
I ← Invariant(while b do cb end)
if K = ∀ then
Ψbody ← StatementVC(cb ,K , I , S,E)
else if K = ∃ then
V ← Variant(while b do cb end)
varDec← 0 ≤ V < V [v ′/v]
Ψbody ← StatementVC(cb ,K , I ∧ varDec, S,E)
Ψloop ← ∀v ′.(b ∧ I =⇒ Ψbody )[v ′/v]
Ψend ← ∀v ′.(¬b ∧ I =⇒ Ψ)[v ′/v]
return I ∧ Ψloop ∧ Ψend
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: May 2020.
RHLE 17
selecting the next program statement to reason about as the verification algorithm steps through
programs. If p∃ is not empty, ChooseStep returns (c∃,∃,p∀,p ′∃), where c∃ is the last statement of
the last program in p∃ and p ′∃ is p∃ with c∃ removed from the last program (or without the last
program altogether if c∃ was the only statement remaining.) If p∃ is empty, ChooseStep returns
(c∀,∀,p ′∀, nil), where c∀ is the last statement of the last program in p∀, p ′∀ is p∀ with c∀ removed
from the last program (or without the last program if c∀ was its only statement), and nil is the
empty list. Note that for the verification algorithm presented below, it is important to step through
existential executions first in order to ensure the final verification conditions have the proper
forall-exists quantifier ordering. In principle, this restriction could be removed by, e.g., tracking the
quantification context of each program variable and prepending the appropriate quantifiers as a
final step of verification condition construction.
The procedure for generating verification conditions has two components:
(1) StatementVC, presented as Algorithm 1, generates verification conditions for non-relational
Hoare triples. It handles both universal and existential non-relational Hoare logic, using the
K parameter to indicate whether universal or existential logic should be used.
(2) RhleVC, presented as Algorithm 2, generates verification conditions for RHLE triples. It
operates by applying the Step rules based on the direction of ChooseStep and relying on
StatementVC to generate the next set of verification conditions. RhleVC terminates when all
statements have been considered, at which point the accumulated verification conditions are
discharged by a solver for the underlying assertion logic.
Example Verification. To illustrate the operation of the above verification algorithm, consider the
following relational property which encodes a simple program refinement:
⟨⊤⟩ x1 := RandB(5) ∼∃ x2 := RandB(10) ⟨x1 = x2⟩
Assume RandB has the following specifications:
ax∀ RandB(n) {⊤}{0 ≤ ρ < n}
ax∃ RandB(n) n {⊤}{ρ = 0 ∨ · · · ∨ ρ = n − 1}
Verification begins by calling RhleVC with:
Φ : ⊤ Ψ : x1 = x2
P∀ : [x1 := RandB(5)] P∃ : [x2 := RandB(10)]
Since there are programs remaining, the verifier calls ChooseStep which yields:
(x2 := RandB(10),∃, [x1 := RandB(5)], nil)
The selected program statement x2 := RandB(10) is then given to StatementVC, which matches as a
function call withK = ∃. According to the existential spec, (P ,Q) here will be (⊤, ρ = 0∨· · ·∨ρ = 9),
but Simplify(Q[v/ρ, 10/n]) results in the more manageable ∃t .0 ≤ t < 10 =⇒ v = t . StatementVC
uses this simplification to construct the following formula:
⊤ ∧ (∃t ,v .0 ≤ t < 10 =⇒ v = t) ∧ (∃t . ∀v . (0 ≤ t < 10 =⇒ v = t) =⇒ x1 = v
Note that by leaving variables from other executions free in the postcondition Ψ given to State-
mentVC, substitution over variables in the execution currently being considered modifies the
relational postcondition in the desired way. Eliding the trivial clauses for brevity, the next recursive
invocation of RhleVC is made with:
Φ : ⊤ Ψ : ∃t . ∀v . (0 ≤ t < 10 =⇒ v = t) =⇒ x1 = v
P∀ : [x1 := RandB(5)] P∃ : nil
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At this point, ChooseStep will pick the only remaining program statement, x1 := RandB(5). State-
mentVC again matches this as a function call, but this time with K = ∀. In the universal con-
text, RandB’s specification is (⊤, 0 ≤ ρ < n), which yields a StatementVC return value of
⊤ ∧ (0 ≤ x1 < 5 =⇒ Ψ) for the value of Ψ listed above. RhleVC then recurses once more
with:
Φ : ⊤ Ψ : 0 ≤ x1 < 5 =⇒ (∃t . ∀v . (0 ≤ t < 10 =⇒ v = t) =⇒ x1 = v)
P∀ : nil P∃ : nil
Since P∀ = P∃ = nil, RhleVC terminates by handing Φ =⇒ Ψ off to the underlying assertion logic’s
decision procedure. In this case, t can always be instantiated with x1, so the property verifies.
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In order to evaluate both RHLE and the verification algorithm presented in the previous section,
we address the following questions:
(R1) Is our approach expressive enough to represent a variety of existential and ∀∃ properties?
(R2) Is our verification algorithm effective, that is, can an implementation successfully verify or
reject a diverse corpus of programs?
(R3) Is it possible to realize an efficient implementation of our algorithm which returns results
within a reasonable time frame?
To help answer these questions, we have developedORHLE, an automatic program verifierwritten
in Haskell. ORHLE implements the algorithm from Section 5 via the following implementations of
its abstract procedures:
Verify: ORHLE uses Z3 as a backend solver for verifying verification conditions.
Variant: ORHLE requires existentially quantified input programs to be annotated with the loop
variants to be used when generating verification conditions.
Invariant: ORHLE requires all input programs to be annotated with the loop invariants to be
used when generating verification conditions.
Simplify: ORHLE accepts existential function specifications encoded in an already simplified
form, obviating the need for an explicit Simplify procedure. We will describe the shape of these
specifications shortly.
Input to ORHLE consists of a collection of FunIMP programs, a declaration of how many copies
of each program should be included in the universal and existential contexts, and a collection of
function specifications expressed using the SMT-LIB2 format. As previously noted, input programs
must specify loop invariants and loop variants. Each input listing may be annotated as valid or
invalid to categorize the expected verification result; this is only for bookkeeping purposes and
does not affect the actual verification mechanics. Figure 17 in the appendix has example ORHLE
input listings.
ORHLE outputs a set of generated verification conditions along with a verification success
or failure message. When a property fails to verify, ORHLE outputs a falsifying model for the
verification conditions.
Encoding Existential Function Specifications. The underapproximate function specifications de-
scribed in Section 3.1 enumerate all the required behaviors of a function. While this formu-
lation is quite expressive, specifications in this style can become quite verbose. As an exam-
ple, consider a function rand10K() that can return any number between 0 and 10, 000. A com-
plete existential specification of this function would be a 10,000-liveness property of the form
ρ1 = 0∨ ρ2 = 1∨ · · · ∨ ρ10,000 = 9, 999. To avoid this problem, ORHLE uses a more concise encoding
of existential function specifications that, while less expressive, is sufficient to handle all of the
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benchmarks in our evaluation. Existential function specifications in ORHLE are expressed in terms
of a template variable that may appear in the function’s precondition and postcondition. A template
variable k defines a k-hyperproperty consisting of a conjunction of every instantiation of k . Using
template variables, the ORHLE specification for the rand10K() function described above becomes:
rand10K() {
templateVars: k;
pre: (and (≤ 0 k) (< k 10000));
post: (= ret! k);
}
Pleasantly, the verification conditions for function calls encoded in this style can be greatly
simplified by existentially quantifying over a function’s template variables, avoiding the generating
of a large disjunction of formulae. Concretely, the verification condition ORHLE generates for the
function call y := rand10K() has the form ∃k . (0 ≤ k < 10000 ∧ y = k ∧ . . . ). Thus, identifying
which existential behavior to return becomes a matter of finding instantiations of the existentially
quantified template variables that satisfy the verification conditions, a concern ultimately handled
by the underlying SMT solver.
Time (s) Valid Verified
Winning Strategy
DoNothing 0.078 ✗ ✗
DrawOnce 0.087 ✗ ✗
DrawUntil21 0.078 ✓ ✓
Branching Time†
AFEFP-succeed 0.088 ✓ ✓
AFP-fail 0.078 ✗ ✗
AFP-succeed 0.078 ✓ ✓
AGAFP-fail 0.078 ✗ ✗
AGAFP-succeed 0.112 ✓ ✓
AGEFP-succeed 0.078 ✓ ✓
EFAFP-succeed 0.087 ✓ ✓
EFAGP-succeed 0.037 ✓ ✓
† Branching time logic examples inspired by Cook and Koskinen [2013].
Fig. 14. ORHLE verification results over a set of single-execution properties.
To answer questions (R1)-(R3), we have developed a suite of programs showcasing a variety of
single and relational specifications drawn from the literature. We first address the expressivity
of ORHLE (R1) by describing the range of properties considered in our benchmarks. Figure 14
presents our evaluation of RHLE on single programs. These properties used in this suite fall into
two categories: winning strategy and branching time properties.
Winning Strategy. These programs in this category play a simplified game of blackjack. The
“Players” (i.e. programs) in this game start with two cards, with each card being valued between
1 and 10. Players can request new cards, and each new card adds between 1 and 10 to their
hand value. The goal is to get a hand value as close to 21 as possible without going over. The
property of interest here is verifying if a player is capable of achieving the maximum hand value
of 21 given any starting hand, even if it does not guarantee a win every game. This property is
expressed as a single existentially quantified execution with precondition 2 ≤ handValue ≤ 20
and postcondition handValue = 21. The three strategies considered are DoNothing, which never
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requests any additional cards, DrawOnce, which requests a single additional card every game, and
DrawUntil21, which keeps drawing cards until it either reaches 21 or goes bust. Only the final
strategy can reach 21 on any starting hand; the other two strategies will not be able to reach 21 on,
e.g., a starting hand value of 2.
Branching Time Properties. Our next set of benchmarks are an adaption of the evaluation from
Cook and Koskinen [2013]. Their evaluation considered several branching time properties which
were not expressible as HLE specifications; indeed many of the original benchmarks are not
verifiable over finite executions at all. Nevertheless, HLE’s ability to assert the existence of desirable
final states given possibly-terminating programs allowsORHLE to verify the limited set of branching
time properties shown in Figure 14.
Time (s) Valid Verified
Program Refinement
Add3Shuffled 0.087 ✗ ✗
Add3Sorted 0.109 ✓ ✓
ConditionalNonRefinement 0.121 ✗ ✗
ConditionalRefinement 0.095 ✓ ✓
LoopNonRefinement 0.091 ✗ ✗
LoopRefinement 44.834 ✓ ✓
SimpleNonRefinement 0.114 ✗ ✗
SimpleRefinement 0.114 ✓ ✓
Non-Interference
Denning1 ‡ 0.099 ✓ ✓
Denning2 ‡ 0.098 ✗ ✗
NonDetLeak 1.571 ✗ ✗
NonDetLeak2 0.089 ✗ ✗
NonDetNonLeak 0.089 ✓ ✓
NonDetNonLeak2 0.098 ✓ ✓
SimpleLeak 0.084 ✗ ✗
SimpleNonLeak 0.090 ✓ ✓
Smith1[Smith 2007] 0.080 ✗ ✗
Time (s) Valid Verified
Delimited Release†
AvgSalariesNoDR 0.080 ✗ ✗
AvgSalaries 0.084 ✓ ✓
ConditionalLeak 0.083 ✗ ✗
ConditionalNoDR 0.084 ✗ ✗
Conditional 0.084 ✓ ✓
MedianNoDR 0.108 ✗ ✗
Median 0.147 ✓ ✓
ParityFun 0.077 ✓ ✓
ParityNoDR 0.077 ✗ ✗
Parity 0.078 ✓ ✓
Parity2 0.082 ✓ ✓
WalletNoDR 0.082 ✗ ✗
Wallet 0.036 ✓ ✓
Parameter Usage
CompletelyUnused 0.084 ✗ ✗
NonDetUnused 0.110 ✗ ✗
NonDetUsed 0.175 ✓ ✓
SemanticallyUnused 0.079 ✗ ✗
ThreeUsed 0.082 ✓ ✓
† Delimited release examples taken from Rastogi et al. [2013]; Sabelfeld and Myers [2003]
‡ Noninterference examples from Denning and Denning [1977]
Fig. 15. ORHLE verification results over a set of relational properties.
Our next set of benchmarks, presented in Figure 15, cover ORHLE’s support for relational
program verification.
Program Refinement. Benchmarks in the program refinement category attempt to verify that a
program is a refinement of another. To be a valid refinement, a program may only exhibit some
subset of behaviors of the original program. This property is formalized in ORHLE in terms of the
possible outputs for each program when given the same inputs:
∀refinement,∃original. Pre : refinementin = originalin
Post : refinementout = originalout
While FunIMP supports refinement via its implementation context, it requires the original and
refined client programs to be syntactically identical. ORHLE is also able to verify a more semantic
notion of refinement. For example, given the program
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c := flipCoin(); if c == heads then r := 1 else r := 2, the program r := 1 is a valid refinement, as it
always returns a value the original program could have returned. However, the program c :=
flipCoin(); if c == heads then r := 1 else r := 3 is not a valid refinement, as it can sometimes return
a value the original program cannot.
Non-Interference. Generalized non-interference is a possibilistic information security property
which ensures that nondeterministic programs do not leak knowledge about high-security state via
low-security outputs. In other words, it should never be possible to deduce anything about private
state based solely on public outputs. Formalization of this property in ORHLE is based on Mclean
[1996] and requires that, for any execution of a program p whose state is divided into high security
pH and low security pL , any other starting state with the same low inputs can potentially yield the
same low outputs:
∀a,∃e . Pre : aL = eL
Post : aL = eL
For example, the program visible := secret mod 2, where secret is high security and visible is low
security, does not satisfy non-interference as it leaks the parity of secret to visible.
Delimited Release. Delimited release properties are similar to non-interference as described
above, but do allow for specific information about high security state to be exposed via low security
outputs. For example, perhaps it is acceptable to leak the parity of secret in the above example as
long as no other information about secret escapes. Delimited release can be formalized on ORHLE
by requiring starting states to agree on the values of the set DR of released secrets:
∀a,∃e . Pre : aL = eL ∧ aDR = eDR
Post : aL = eL
For example, releasing the parity of secret in the above example corresponds to the specification:
∀parity1,∃parity2. Pre : visible1 = visible2 ∧ (secret1 mod 2) = (secret2 mod 2)
Post : visible1 = visible2
An alternate style is to express delimited release in the postcondition:
∀a,∃e . Pre : aL = eL
Post : aDR = eDR =⇒ aL = eL
Expressing the release in terms of the final state in this way can be more convenient, as it allows
the program to release whatever parts of the initial state allow some piece of final state to be public.
However, this can sometimes obscure exactly which parts of the initial state are being released.
Parameter Usage. Finally, our parameter usage benchmarks attempt verify that a parameter to
some program is meaningful, in that the program does not always yield the same return value
regardless of the parameter’s value. The relational property asserts the existence of two executions
that differ in both their value of the parameter in question and their output value. For example, for a
program p that takes parameters a and b and returns a value ρ, the parameter a is not meaningless
if:
∃p1,p2. Pre : a1 , a2 ∧ b1 = b2
Post : ρ1 , ρ2
To show that ORHLE is both effective and efficient (R2)-(R3), we have used ORHLE to verify
and/or invalidate examples of the properties described above. Figures 15 and 14 present the results
of these experiments. Both the single-execution and relational experiments were done using an
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Intel Core i7-6700K CPU with 8 4GHz cores. For each benchmark, the Time (s) column records the
verification time, the Valid column records the expected result, and the Verified records the result
returned by ORHLE. As shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15, our examples included a mix of programs
that were expected to verify or fail to verify on a variety of properties, and ORHLE yielded the
expected result in all cases. Verification across these benchmark properties was quite fast, with
most verification tasks completing in under 30s. Taken together, these results offer evidence that
ORHLE is both effective and efficient.
7 RELATEDWORK
We consider two broad categories of related work in this section: first comparing HLE to other
approaches to underapproximating individual program behaviors and then relating RHLE to other
approaches for relational program reasoning.
Underapproximating Nondeterministic Behaviors. Reverse Hoare Logic [de Vries and Koutavas
2011] is a program logic for reasoning about reachability over single executions of programs which
have access to a nondeterministic binary choice (⊔) operator. In this sense, it is quite similar to HLE
described in Section 4. A reverse Hoare logic triple of the form ⟨P⟩c ⟨Q⟩ is valid when, for all states
σ ′ satisfying Q , there exists a state σ satisfying P such that σ , c ⇓ σ ′. The authors also present a
forward-reasoning predicate transformer semantics given in the form of a weakest postcondition
calculus. While reverse Hoare logic requires there to exist a satisfying start state for all satisfying
end states (∀σ ′∃σ ), HLE requires there to exist a satisfying end state for all satisfying start states
(∀σ∃σ ′.) More recently, OâĂŹHearn [2019] have developed Incorrectness Logic, which extends
reverse Hoare Logic to support a more realistic programming language. As it also reasons about
reachability over single executions, incorrectness logic is close to the non-relational existential
logic (HLE) developed in Section 4. While logically similar, we note that the framing of Reverse
Hoare Logic and Incorrectness Logic are quite different from HLE, in that the former systems focus
on working backwards from final states to initial states, while HLE emphasizes reasoning forward.
First-order dynamic logic[Pratt 1976] is a reinterpretation of Hoare logic in first-order, multi-
modal logic. Dynamic logic programs are constructed by regular expression operators extended
with operators for e.g. testing and assignment. For a program p, the modal operators [p] and
⟨p⟩ capture universal and existential quantification over program executions. In particular, the
formula [p]Q means that after executing p, all end states satisfy Q , and the dual ⟨p⟩Q means that
after executing p, there exists some end state satisfying Q . The axiomatic proof rules for dynamic
logic closely correspond to the weakest precondition transformer, in that [p]Q ⇐⇒ wlp(p,Q),
where wlp is the weakest liberal precondition, and ⟨p⟩Q ⇐⇒ wp∃(p,Q), where wp∃ is the
weakest precondition for existential Hoare logic. Therefore, the universal Hoare triple ⊢ {P}p{Q}
corresponds to P =⇒ [p]Q , and the existential Hoare triple ⊢ [P]p[Q]∃ corresponds to P =⇒ ⟨p⟩Q .
In contrast to dynamic logic, HLE reasons over a more conventional imperative language that
supports unbounded nondeterministic choice with relational specifications.
There exist several other modal logics which suport a similar style of existential reasoning as
HLE. Temporal logics like LTL and CTL are popular systems for verifying liveness properties, and
variants like HyperLTL and HyperCTL can be used to verify liveness hyperproperties. (See [Clarke
et al. 1994; Clarkson et al. 2014] for surveys.) A recent paper by [Coenen et al. 2019] examines
verification and synthesis of computational models using HyperLTL formulas with alternating
quantifiers, leading to analysis of the kinds of ∀∃ properties considered here. [Cook and Koskinen
2013] examines existential reasoning in branching-time temporal logics by way of removing state
space until universal reasoning methods can be used. While temporal logics are capable of reasoning
about the kinds of liveness properties we consider in this paper, they operate over finite state
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models of software systems instead of reasoning directly over program syntax in the way HLE
does.
Reasoning about Relational Properties. The concept of a hyperproperty was originally introduced
by Clarkson and Schneider [2010], building off of earlier work by Terauchi and Aiken [Terauchi and
Aiken 2005]. Clarkson and Schneider define hyperproperties as finite properties over a potentially
infinite set of execution traces, and demonstrate that every trace hyperproperty is an intersection
of safety and liveness hyperproperties. They further identify the class of k-safety hyperproperties
as those in which the a bad state cannot involve more than k traces. Although not explicitly defined
in Clarkson and Schneider [2010], the analogous concept of k-liveness hyperproperties is implicit
in that work. While they discuss verification, they do not offer a verification algorithm.
Relational program logics are a common approach to verifying relational specifications. Rela-
tional Hoare Logic[Benton 2004] (RHLP) was one of the first examples of these logics. Originally
developed by Benton, RHL provides an axiomatic system for proving 2-safety properties of im-
perative programs. The logic is shown to be sound, but no automated verification algorithm is
given. Relational Higher-order Logic[Aguirre et al. 2017] is a higher-order relational logic for
reasoning about higher-order functional programs expressed in a simply-typed λ-calculus. Prob-
abilistic RHL [Barthe et al. 2009] is a logic for reasoning about probabilistic programs, with the
goal of proving security properties of cryptographic schemes like Hashed ElGamal encryption
and the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem. The relational logic closest to RHLE is Cartesian Hoare
Logic[Sousa and Dillig 2016] (CHL) developed by Sousa and Dillig. This logic which provides an
axiomatic system for reasoning about k-safety hyperproperties along with an automatic verification
algorithm. ORHLE can be thought of as an extension of CHL for reasoning about a larger class of
hyperproperties via an existentially quantified Hoare logic.
Product programs are another approach to the verification of relational properties. The basic
technique is to transform multiple programs with a relational property into an equivalent single
program with a non-relational property[Barthe et al. 2011a]. Standard verification tools may
then be used to verify the resulting product program. The advantage to this approach is it can
leverage existing non-relational verification tools and techniques, but large state space of product
programsmakes verification difficult in practice. Product programs have been used to verify k-safety
properties and reason about non-interference and secure information flow[Barthe et al. 2011b;
KovÃącs et al. 2013]. The most closely related work in this space is that of Barthe et al. [2013],
which develops a set of necessary conditions for “left-product programs”. These product programs
can be used to verify hyperproperties outside of k-safety, including the ∀∃-hyperproperties RHLE
deals with, although the work does not address how to construct left-product programs.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a flexible approach for expressing underapproximate specifications of nonde-
terministic choices as hyperproperties. We discussed a program logic called HLE which uses such
specifications to establish the existence of desirable program paths in nondeterministic programs,
as well as a relational program logic called RHLE capable of verifying a class of relational property
we term “∀∃ properties.” In addition, we have provided an algorithm for deciding the validity of
∀∃ properties, as well as an implementation of this algorithm in a tool called ORHLE. We have
demonstrated that RHLE is able to express a variety of interesting relational properties, and pro-
vided experimental evidence that ORHLE is able to correctly decide the validity of these sorts of
existential properties in a reasonable time frame over a suite of example programs.
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A UNIVERSAL HOARE LOGIC
|= P =⇒ P ′ |= Q ′ =⇒ Q S ⊢ {P ′} c {Q ′}
S ⊢ {P} c {Q} ∀Conseq S ⊢ {P} skip {P} ∀Skip
S ⊢ {P[a/x]} x := a {P} ∀Assgn
S ⊢ {P} c1 {P ′} S ⊢
{
P ′
}
c2 {Q}
S ⊢ {P} c1; c2 {Q}
∀Seq
S ⊢ {P ∧ b} c1 {Q} S ⊢ {P ∧ ¬b} c2 {Q}
S ⊢ {P} if b then c1 else c2 {Q}
∀Cond S ⊢ {P ∧ b} c {P}
S ⊢ {P} while b do c end {P ∧ ¬b} ∀While
S(f ) = ax f (x){P}{Q}
S ⊢
{
P[a/x] ∧ ∀v .Q[v/ρ;a/x] =⇒ Q[v/y]
}
y := f (a) {Q}
∀Spec
Fig. 16. Proof rules for a universal Hoare logic for FunIMP.
B PROOFS
Theorem B.1. When run under a compatible context I with an OK initial state σ , a program p will
either diverge or evaluate to a state σ ′ which is also produced by one of its axiomatic executions.
I |= S ∧ S ⊢ σ , p is OK ∧ S, I ⊢ σ ,p ⇓ σ ′ =⇒ S, · ⊢ σ ,p ⇓ σ ′
Proof. By induction over the derivation of S, I ⊢ σ ,p ⇓ σ ′. The only interesting case is ECallDef,
which follows immediately from the assumptions that p does not get stuck and that every definition
in I meets its axiomatic specification in S . □
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Theorem B.2. Suppose that existential and axiomatic contexts E and S are coherent, and furthermore
that the function context I is compatible with E. If a program p that is productive from initial state σ
with respective to set Q , then it must be the case that from σ p is able to terminate in some final state
σ ′ satisfying Q :
E, · ⊢ σ ,p ' Q ∧ I |=∃ E ∧ S ⊇ I =⇒ ∃σ ′.S, I ⊢ σ ,p ⇓ σ ′ ∧ σ ′ |= Q
Proof. Coherent contexts preserve productivity, allowing us to conclude E, I ⊢ σ ,p ' Q from
the first two assumptions. Combined with the assumption that E and S are coherent, the desired
conclusion follows from the fact that productivity is strong enough to ensure that p can terminate
in some final state σ ′ satisfying Q . □
Theorem B.3 (RHLE is Sound). Suppose we are given a pair of coherent existential and axiomatic
contexts E and S , and that furthermore we can deduce the RHLE triple S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ⟩ p∀ ∼∃ p∃ ⟨Ψ⟩. Then,
for any function context I compatible with both S and E, any set of initial states σ∀ and σ∃ satisfying
Φ, and for every set of final states σ ′∀ produced by p∀, there exists a corresponding set of final states
produced by p∃ such that σ ′∀ and σ
′
∃ satisfy Ψ:
S ⊇ E ∧
(∀σ .σ |= Φ =⇒ S ⊢ σ , p∀ is OK) ∧
S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ⟩ p∀ ∼∃ p∃ ⟨Ψ⟩ =⇒
∀I . I |= S ∧ I |=∃ E =⇒
∀σ∀ σ∃. σ∀ σ∃ |= Φ =⇒
∀σ ′∀. S, I ⊢ σ∀,p∀ ⇓ σ ′∀ =⇒ ∃σ ′∃. S, I ⊢ σ∃,p∃ ⇓ σ ′∃ ∧ σ ′∀, σ ′∃ |= Ψ
Proof. We first prove a stronger property by induction on the triple S,E ⊢ ⟨Φ⟩ p∀ ∼∃ p∃ ⟨Ψ⟩:
namely, that in the empty implementation context, p∃ are productive with respect to every set of
final states produced by p∀, for any set of initial states satisfying the precondition Φ:
∀σ∀ σ∃. σ∀ σ∃ |= Φ ∧ ∀σ ′∀. S, · ⊢ σ∀,p∀ ⇓ σ ′∀ =⇒ S, · ⊢ σ∃,p∃ ⋏ {σ ′∃ | σ ′∀,σ ′∃ |= Ψ} (10)
By Theorem B.1 and the fact that I is compatible with S , the assumption that Φ ensures every
program in p∀ will not get stuck, and our assumption that S, I ⊢ σ∀,p∀ ⇓ σ ′∀, it follows that:
S, · ⊢ σ∀,p∀ ⇓ σ ′∀ (11)
Armed with (10) and (11), the assumption that I is compatible with E, and the assumption that
S and E are coherent, by a corollary of Theorem B.2 we can conclude the desired result, i.e.
∃σ ′∃. S, I ⊢ σ∃,p∃ ⇓ σ ′∃ ∧ σ ′∀, σ ′∃ |= Ψ. □
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C EXAMPLE ORHLE INPUT
// A program that never leaks high-
// security state.
expected: valid;
forall: run[1];
exists: run[2];
pre: (= run!1!low run!2!low);
post: (= run!1!low run!2!low);
aspecs:
flipCoin() {
pre: true;
post: (or (= ret! 0) (= ret! 1));
}
especs:
flipCoin() {
templateVars: n;
pre: (or (= n 0) (= n 1));
post: (= ret! n);
}
prog run(high, low):
if (low < high) then
low := 0;
else
low := 1;
end
flip := call flipCoin();
if (flip == 0) then
low := 1 - low;
else
skip;
end
endp
// A program that sometimes (but not
// always) leaks high-security state.
expected: invalid;
forall: run[1];
exists: run[2];
pre: (= run!1!low run!2!low);
post: (= run!1!low run!2!low);
aspecs:
flipCoin() {
pre: true;
post: (or (= ret! 0) (= ret! 1));
}
especs:
flipCoin() {
templateVars: n;
pre: (or (= n 0) (= n 1));
post: (= ret! n);
}
prog run(high, low):
flip := call flipCoin();
if (flip == 0) then
low := high + low;
else
skip;
end
endp
Fig. 17. Example ORHLE input listings. The listing on the left verifies a noninterference property, namely
that the program never leaks any information about the variable high. Note that the underapproximation
of flipCoin is required: if linked to a flipCoin implementation that always returns 0, for example, attackers
could always know whether or not the initial value of low was less than high by observing low. Conversely,
ORHLE identifies a violation of noninterference in the listing on the right: the program might leak the value
of high, depending on the outcome of flipCoin .
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